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Do good looks make people more productive? An impact of looks on earnings has been 
found in the empirical literature: plain people earn less than average-looking people who 
earn less than the good-looking. However, an important question remains unanswered: is 
the impact of beauty due to pure discrimination or productivity? We provide evidence 
against the hypothesis of Becker-type discrimination stemming from tastes and in favor of 
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I. Introduction 
 
  Following on the seminal paper by Becker (1957) on discrimination, there has been a 
vast empirical literature measuring differences in earnings or other labor markets outcomes 
between different groups of workers. The impact of appearance on wages is now quite well 
documented. For instance, weight seems to be affecting mainly female wages, with a wage 
penalty for obese women (Averett and Korenman, 1996). Persico et al. (2004) explain the 
origin of the “height premium”, i.e., the increase in wage that goes with an additional inch 
of height, and find that it is the height at teens age that essentially determines the returns to 
height.  
Recent research has studied how physical appearance, i.e., beauty, affects labor markets 
outcomes. However, this task is usually complicated by the fact that different groups may 
have different productivities. Hamermesh and Biddle (H&B, 1994) and Biddle and 
Hamermesh (1998) found evidence that beauty affects earnings irrespective of gender. 
They also found that the labor market sorts the best-looking people into occupations where 
looks are likely to be more important (hence productive), but this latter evidence is rather 
weak. Using physical appearance as a possible source of discrimination makes it easier to 
distinguish labor-market outcomes arising from discrimination against a group (the homely 
in this case) from those produced by unobserved productivity. In fact, it can be argued that 
there are activities in which appearance is more important and where the payoff to beauty 
then reflects productivity, and other jobs where any such payoff reflects pure 
discrimination. 
Similarly, for the UK labor market, Harper (2000) found that physical appearance has a 
substantial effect on earnings. He also found that beauty has a very significant impact in the 
marriage market. However all these studies, like many others on the effects of various 
ascriptive characteristics on wages, find it difficult to distinguish whether the wage 
differential is due to Becker-type discrimination stemming from tastes or to differences in 
productivity. Indeed, “.. it is very difficult to construct a research design that allows one to 
distinguish labor-market outcomes arising from discrimination against a group from those 
produced by intergroup differences in unobserved (by the researcher) productivity..” (H&B, 
1994: 1175). 
In an attempt to disentangle these effects, a recent paper by Pfann et al. (2000) on a 
sample of Dutch advertising firms finds that those with better-looking executives have 
higher revenues and hence pay them more. However, the fact that beauty is highly   3
productive in the advertising sector may not come as a surprise. Another paper by 
Hamermesh and Parker (H&P, 2003) shows that lecturers who are viewed as better looking 
receive higher instructional ratings by their students. Then, ceteris paribus, these higher 
ratings translate into higher salaries, because US university administrators pay attention 
also to teaching quality in setting salaries. However, the question remains on whether 
students are simply discriminating against ugly professors by reacting to an irrelevant 
characteristic, or if they do really learn less from them. And again, more generally, “... 
disentangling the effects of differential outcomes resulting from productivity differences 
and those resulting from discrimination is extremely difficult in all cases …” (H&P, 2003: 
12). 
This paper is a contribution to the debate on whether the labor market outcome of 
ascriptive characteristics represents productivity or discrimination. Using a rich set of data 
from the College of Economics at the University of XX, we examine the effects of 
students’ physical appearance on examination results. We find evidence that beauty has a 
significant impact on academic performance, a result which is consistent with and 
comparable to the impact found in the labor market literature. In addition, since we can 
compare student performances in oral and written exams, where in the latter the evaluation 
is blind, i.e., not influenced by physical appearance, we can in fact understand better the 
source of the “beauty premium”, that is disentangle productivity from discrimination 
effects. We find that the effect of beauty on academic performance cannot be ascribed to 
pure professor discrimination. One could then argue that to the extent that wages rise with 
educational attainments, our findings corroborate the hypothesis that the payoffs to beauty 
reflect differences in productivity. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the working of university system 
for students in Italy and the dataset that we use to analyze the role of looks. Section III 
presents the main empirical results of the paper, first showing the impact of beauty on 
students’ performance and then disentangling the discrimination and productivity effects. 
Section IV briefly discusses some possible explanations based on psychological and 
economic theories which help to interpret our results. Section V concludes the paper. 
 
 
II. Data and institutional details 
   4
In the 2001-2002 academic year, a substantial reform of university degrees took place in 
Italy. In order to make university education more suitable for the job market and to improve 
on graduation rates,
2 the official duration of undergraduate degrees was reduced from 4 to 3 
years. According to the Ministry of University, this would make the Italian university 
degrees (Laurea) more comparable with analogous degrees in other European countries, as 
agreed with the Bologna Convention among EU Education Ministers. In addition, in the 
new system more motivated students can further acquire education by adding 2 more years 
to obtain a specialized degree, the Laurea Specialistica, and then enter into PhD programs. 
Students enrolled at the College of Economics at the University of XX, like those in 
most Italian universities, are offered two types of examinations, verbal or written. Each 
professor is free to choose whether to set an oral or a written exam. In some cases the exam 
is both oral and written, but only a final mark (sometimes the average, some other times 
other combinations) is recorded. In addition, in Italian universities students are allowed to 
take examinations many times during the academic year, and it may happen that a student 
attending a class can take the exam either at the end of the course or in other dates during 
the following months or even years. Therefore there is more than one examination session 
in the academic year and in each session a student can take (almost) as many exams as 
he/she likes. 
In the period under consideration, in the College of Economics there were 3 sessions 
every year. The Winter session, held in January and February, was about 8 week long, and 
the exams for each course were delivered at three different dates, at least two-week apart; 
the Summer session, in June and July, about 7-8 week long, in which again for each course 
students had the opportunity to take exams three times; and the Fall session, shorter (3 
weeks), in which exams were delivered only one or at most two times per course. 
Therefore, every year students had the opportunity to find 7 to 8 dates at which to take the 
exams for each course. 
The exam evaluation and grading is based on grades with a scale going from 0 to 30 
(with 30 cum laude being awarded in some cases) and the pass threshold set at 18. However 
no mark is ever recorded when below 18. If students fail an exam, i.e., they get a grade 
below 18, there is no official record of the event (nor even that they have attempted), and 
they can take the exam again some other time. When marks are released, but before they 
                                                           
2 In Italian universities, on average, the drop out rate under the old system was 60%. The average time spent 
to complete a first degree was 7 years and only 4.6% of students graduated on time. With the new system of 
three-year degrees provisional results show that 41% of students graduate on time, that is within 3.5 years 
(Istat, 2005).   5
are recorded, students can refuse to register the mark in order to re-take the exam in the 
future  and perhaps get a higher mark. In this case, again, there is no record of the first 
attempt. Finally, there is no upper limit on the number of years students can take to finish 
their degree. In order to graduate, however, a student has to pass a certain number of 
exams.
3 Moreover, the final grade coming with the awarded degree is calculated on the 
basis of the simple average of grades obtained during the academic career.  
Table 1 presents the statistics describing our variables. We have collected data on the 
cohort of students at the College of Economics at the University of XX registered for their 
first time in the academic year 2001-2002, observed over three years. There are 885 
students in the dataset, 51.4% of which are female. In our dataset we have data on the type 
of high school they attended, on the high school final grades, the date of birth, and the 
home address. We also obtained detailed information about each student’s academic 
curriculum with examination dates and marks. Our dataset records all individual grades up 
to the 2004 summer session. In theory, since the official duration of their course was 3 
years, by that session any student in our cohort could have graduated. However, a 
negligible number of students - only 10 - did actually graduate. Some students will have 
graduated over the following months, and many more will graduate in 2005 and later years, 
when they complete all the required exams. Quite a lot of them, however, will never 
graduate. 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
For each student, photo-id pictures were also available. Each of the student’s pictures 
was rated by each of five professors: 2 women and 3 men aged respectively 35, 58, 40, 45, 
62 (to accord with the age and sex distribution of university professors in the College). The 
raters viewed all photographs on a high resolution computer screen, one by one, and could 
tick beauty on a 5 (highest) to 1 rating scale.
4 Of course, the ideal measure of beauty would 
account for all of a person’s features capable of making a visual impact on the observer and 
not just the facial features. However, the error this may introduce in the beauty measure is 
unlikely to be systematically related to any of the variables we focus on. Also, Jackson 
(1992) has shown that there is a high correlation between responses to still photographs and 
responses to video tapes of the same stimulus person. Finally, the cited literature on the 
economics of beauty has always used still photographs.  
                                                           
3  In the years under consideration, the required number of courses and hence exams was 37.  
4 They were instructed to use 3 for average look, 4 and 2 for respectively better and worse than average, 5 and 
1 for respectively the beautiful or handsome and the homely. They were allowed to move back to previously 
rated photographs to change or check their ratings.    6
In a series of pair-wise correlations, we found correlations from 0.42 to 0.58 between 
panel members, always highly significant, and given the number of pictures this seems to 
suggest a substantial agreement among evaluators about the appearance of individuals, thus 
confirming the existence of common standards of beauty, as found in the rest of the 
literature. For the beauty index we will use, however, we standardized each rater’s 
evaluation and then created a composite standardized beauty measure for each student by 
summing the five standardized ratings. 
 
 
III. Looks and the Exams 
 
The tuition fees for public universities in Italy are rather low,
5 and thus it is quite 
common that many students are enrolled at university without actually taking exams. In our 
cohort about 27% of the students have not passed a single exam. These may be students 
who have never taken an exam, for example because they enrolled just out of high school 
while looking for a job and then found one, or they may be students who have never passed 
an exam despite attempting. Although, as already explained, we do not have official 
university records of students’ failed attempts, evidence collected from colleagues teaching 
first year courses suggest that about 30% to 50% of students fail each time. This seems to 
suggest that a large portion of “non participating”, i.e., not taking exams, students are 
actually participating but do fail. 
An important aspect of this study is to investigate the effect, if any, of the physical 
appearance on the performance of students. Hence, we consider the impact of beauty on an 
indicator of performance that takes into account both the number and the grades of the 
passed exams using a series of regressions that we present in the next section. In addition, 
in the sections that follow, we further investigate this issue by looking at the effects on the 
number of exams and on the average grade obtained separately, plus some other variables 
that allow us to distinguish between the impact of beauty due to discrimination and 
productivity. Preliminary to our analysis we run a probit regression on the participation of 
students, i.e., having or not passed any exam. The result show that whether or not exams 
are taken is dependent upon beauty.
 6 Therefore, using OLS on the number of exams taken 
only for those students for whom this number is positive gives downwards biased results. 
                                                           
5  About 1000 euro per year at the university under consideration, with similar levels for other Italian public 
universities as well.   7
Also, the number of exams, as well as our index of performace described in the next 
Section, are censored variables where observations are clustered at a lower threshold (zero 
or eighteen) since no mark is ever recorded below the pass mark.  Since in principle marks 
could take on values below eighteen but we do not observe them because of censoring, we 
employ Tobit estimates using all students in the sample.    
 
 
III.1  Evidence of the “beauty premium” 
 
As a primary index of performance we use a composite index of the number of exams 
times the average grade, which is equivalent to the cumulative sum of the grades of the 
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where ni is the number of exams passed by student i,  i g  is the average grade, and gij is the 
grade obtained in the j-th exam.  
Notice that Italian students need to pass successfully a given number of exams before 
being awarded their Laurea. The final grade however is proportional to the grades obtained 
in all the exams during the academic career and hence a student trying to finish her studies 
in a shorter time may be able to do it at the expense of a lower average and hence final 
grade. Since we are considering the records of each student taken at the end of their third 
year, our composite index takes into account both the ability to be fast, i.e., to do a greater 
number of exams and hence to finish earlier, and to have good grades. 
At this stage we are interested on whether physical appearance has an impact on 
performance and hence we estimate the following: 
 log , ii i i perf X b β γε = ++   
where Xi is a vector of student i’s characteristics and bi is the student’s index of physical 
attractiveness. As explained before, since all performances below 18 (one exam times the 
lowest recorded mark of 18) are not registered, we need to employ Tobit estimation of 
students’ performance on their set of characteristics to take truncation into account.  
According to our results (table 2), better looking students perform better in the exams: 
the coefficient is positive and highly significant (at 1%). Moving from one standard 
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deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above leads to an increase in the 
performance of about 38%. Hence there appears to be evidence that beauty – as already 
found in labor markets, where it affects wages – can affect performance. In addition, the 
magnitude seems comparable to what is found in labor market studies. For instance, H&B 
(1994), using data from North-America, found pay premium for above average looking 
people of about 1-13% and pay penalties for below average looking people of 1-15%, 
according to the available dataset. Harper (2000), using UK data, found a pay penalty 
ranging from 4% to 14.9% for unattractive men and around 10.9% for unattractive women. 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
Before testing for the robustness of this result, however, we look also at the effect of 
other characteristics on students’ performances. Being just out of high school (year_82), on 
the other hand, increases the probability of doing better at university. This effect may be 
related to the fact that these students are in a sense just “minted” (fresh of studies) and 
hence may find it easier to pass exams. Alternatively, and more likely, these students in fact 
do not participate yet in the labor market, and hence their opportunity cost of studying may 
be lower than part-time students, i.e., those that have already a job. In other words, these 
students may have acquired and not yet forgotten the right skills to succeed in school, or 
more likely, fresh graduates may have fewer occupation opportunities
7 and hence may 
happen to be full-time students and be less distracted by work duties from their academic 
career.
  
A similar effect is related to the type of high school the students were enrolled before 
going to university. It appears that students who attended a “liceo”, i.e., a high school that 
gives a general purpose education, either in the humanities, sciences, liberal arts, or 
languages, are better performers than student coming from professional schools. Indeed, 
professional schools are known for being less demanding on their students while the 
curriculum is more rigorous and demanding in a liceo. Technical schools are more 
demanding than a professional school and less than liceo, however the corresponding 
dummy variable is not significantly different from zero. 
The students coming from liceo have probably fewer opportunities in the labor market in 
the short run, at least compared to students graduated from technical or professional high 
schools, and hence their opportunity cost of studying may be implicitly lower. Although we 
would need to have more information, for instance on family background, to explain 
                                                           
7  In the North-East of Italy, the unemployment rate is quite low (about 3.5%), even among young people 
(9.8% for 15-24 and only 4.1% for 25-24 year old).   9
educational choices and students’ performances, notice that the type of high school chosen 
is in fact related to family background, especially income levels and parents occupation and 
class, e.g., working or middle class. Middle class families, indeed, tend to send their 
children to liceo, known for being better equipped to prepare students for Universities, 
where they expect their children will go after high school. On the other hand, working class 
families may prefer technical schools, known for providing an education better suited for 
the job market after school. In other words, the choice of the type of schools may reflect, to 
some extent, the family economic and educational background. 
Given the same family background, moreover, the choice of the type of school may 
reflect sorting of students based on their educational abilities: other things equal, students 
going to professional schools may be expected to be less performing on educational 
matters. For this reason, the choice of the type of school attended may also partially pick up 
students’ ability. A better proxy for student ability, however, is the final grade, i.e., the 
graduation grade, from high school. As one would expect, its impact is positive and highly 
significant on students’ performances. To the extent that this grade reflects students’ 
abilities, one can conclude that the more able students coming out of high school also 
perform better at university. 
Another variable that significantly affects students’ performance is the final grade 
obtained in the State exams at the end of high school. This variable is very likely related to 
students’ ability and it is not surprising to find a significant effect, which is also the biggest 
in magnitude among the variables used in these regressions. We also considered a dummy 
variable (eci) for those students enrolled within the same College but in a degree program 
managed in a nearby city. This degree program differs in terms of facilities (there are less) 
and, in part, teaching faculty (more junior, part-time or temporary). The dummy is always 
significant and positive in this and all the subsequent estimates, meaning either that 
students enrolled in this program have better abilities or, more likely, that exams there may 
be relatively easier to pass. 
The dummy for gender is not significant. However, when estimating separate 
regressions for males and females, we find a positive and significant effect of beauty only 
for males, confirming what is found in the labor markets literature. Looking at other 
regressor,  characteristic that has an impact on performance but only for males and at the 
10% level, is the fact that the student is resident in the area where the course is offered 
(resident). If we believe that a student who decides to enroll into a course offered in her 
own town (Province in our case) may be less motivated than a student who decides to   10
enroll into a course in another city, we have to expect that the resident student may have 
lower performances. As can be seen from table 2, the coefficient is indeed negative. 
It is interesting to investigate on whether there is a premium for being handsome or a 
penalty for being homely and if these two effects are in fact symmetrical. In the literature 
indeed there have been different findings. H&B (1994), analyzing US data and estimating 
human capital-type earnings equations, found that penalty for unattractive people were 
greater than premiums for attractive people. The same authors, using Canadian data, 
however found that premium were larger than penalties, with these latter being 
insignificant. Harper (2000), using data from the UK job market, found a larger penalty for 
unattractiveness than H&B (1994).  
We construct a dummy (handsome) for the top 30% most beautiful students and another 
(homely) for the bottom 30% least beautiful students and estimate separate regressions for 
males and females. As it appears from the last two columns of table 3, there is a significant 
penalty for being homely for male students since being in the bottom 30% reduces our 
index of performance to 9% below the average. On the other hand, the premium is small 
and insignificant for males and only significant at 10% for female students. 
In summary, we have shown that physical appearance has a significant and economically 
meaningful effect on the performance of students. First of all, being handsome increases the 
probability that a student in fact takes and pass exams. Second, and more important for us, 
better looking students have better performances than other students. Last, we find that the 
premium for beauty is smaller than the penalty for ugliness. While less economically 
important than the effects of the proxies for education and ability, these impacts seem quite 
significant, as already observed in the literature on labor market outcomes. We now turn to 
investigating on whether the increase in performance is related to different students’ 
productivity or to discrimination. 
 
 
III.2  It’s not discrimination, is it? 
 
In this section we wish to determine whether the effect of beauty on student’s 
performance is the result of unobserved productivity or of pure discrimination by 
professors. If we can reject pure discrimination, one can safely assume that the effects of 
beauty on performance may be explained by different students’ productivity.    11
To investigate the presence of pure discrimination effects we proceed in different steps. 
First, as a preliminary check, we look at the effects of beauty separately on the average 
grade and on the number of exams passed. While the discrimination effect of beauty may 
be at work in obtaining higher grades – teachers could be influenced by physical 
appearance when they can actually see it – it is less clear how it would influence the 
number of exams passed. The number of exams taken and passed is more the result of 
students’ choices and effort, and so could perhaps reflect more productivity than 
discrimination. 
Second, we exploit the type of examination – either oral or written – to disentangle the 
effect of beauty. Given that in written examinations physical appearance is unnoticed, our 
dataset should allow us to see if there is some support to the hypothesis of pure 
discrimination. If look had a (positive) impact on oral exams grades but were unimportant 
in written exams, then we could start asking whether these different effects where due to 
discrimination or whether the type of examination, in the case of the oral exam, was such to 
disadvantage homely people who may just be less confident and under perform in an oral 
exam. 
An important variable in our dataset is thus the number of exams that each student has 
taken in the period under consideration (almost 3 years). As explained in the previous 
section II, this is partly a choice variable, partly the result of students’ effort and ability, in 
the sense that students graduate when they have passed a given number of exams, but there 
is no lower limit on the number of exams that must be taken each year and a student is 
allowed to stay enrolled for as many years as he chooses to. Again, since students may in 
fact have taken exams but not passed them, we need to use Tobit analysis. We then estimate 
the following equation:  
 , ii i i nX b β γε = ++   
and table 3 reports the results of the Tobit estimations of the number of exams passed 
(ni) on different students characteristics. Physical appearance is significant, like other 
variables such as the dummies for the type of high school completed, being just out of high 
school, and not being resident at the university’s location, confirming again the results 
found for the composite performance index.  
The dummy for being a male student is not significant in explaining students’ 
performances in terms of number of exams. However, performing separate regression for 
each gender, we find that physical appearance is significant only for male students. Moving 
from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above increases the   12
number of exams passed by about 25% with respect to the mean. This result confirms the 
impact of beauty on the composite index of performance already seen before, both in 
significance and in the order of magnitude. The number of exams passed in the interval 
considered is a clear measure of productivity and thus we believe this is a first signal that 
beauty has a productivity effect. 
The other variable related to performance that we employ is the exams average grade 
and thus we estimate the following:  
  , ii i i gX b β γε = ++  
where  i g  is the average grade, obtained in the exams. This measure of performance is  
censored too. Indeed, the grades are on a scale between 0 and 30, but in order to pass an 
exam the minimum grade is 18, and it is a general practice that only the grades equal or 
above 18 are registered, while in case of failing the exams, i.e., grades below 18, these are 
censored. To control for this we use a Tobit regression model. As before, beauty does not 
seem to have any significant effect for females, while it is significantly different from zero 
for males even though its impact is not high. The dummies for the type of high school 
attended before enrolling at university plus the final high school grade are also significant. 
Following the second path in our investigation, we look at the, possibly differential, 
impact of beauty on written and oral examinations. In the years under consideration, 37 
exams were to be passed in order to graduate and obtain the Laurea. However, the average 
number of exams passed by active students, i.e., those who took at least one exam, was just 
below 18, and only ten students actually finished all the exams and graduated. Thus, even 
though the type of exam for each course – either written or oral – is a choice of the 
professor, which exams to take first is decided by the student. 
In table 4 we report the results of Tobit regressions on the number of written and oral 
exams respectively. The impact of beauty for males appears to be positive for both type of 
exams, but more important for written examinations where an identical increase in beauty 
increase almost twice as much the number of exams. If we believe in a pure discrimination 
effect of beauty, we would expect, if any, that handsome students would take more oral 
exams, where their beauty could be appreciated. Since we find the opposite result, i.e., that 
beauty has more of an impact on the number of written exams, we believe this gives more 
support to the productivity hypothesis and less to the pure discrimination hypothesis. 
Looking at the average grades for written and oral exams, in table 5, we find that the 
beauty coefficient is significant for both oral and written exams average grades. Again the   13
effect is stronger on written exams.
8 We believe that if beauty had a pure discrimination 
effect, we should find a greater impact of beauty on the oral exams average grades, which 
we do not. Again, the (lack of) evidence in this last set of regressions appears to be more 
consistent with a productivity effect of beauty.  
We also investigate whether beauty has any impact on students’ differences  in 
performances between oral and written exams by estimating the following:  
 , ii i i perf X b β γε ∆=+ +  
where  ∆perfi is the difference in performance between oral and written exams. The 
performances in this case are measured in terms of average grades and number of exams, as 
we will describe shortly. In general, if we believe in the pure discrimination effect of 
beauty, we should expect a better performance of good looking students in oral exams, 
especially in terms of average grades. In other words, if students show better performances 
in oral exams and beauty is found to have a positive and significant impact on it, i.e.,  0, γ >  
there would be some evidence of discrimination. 
In table 6 we report the results of an OLS regression on the differences between the 
average grades obtained in oral and written exams on the usual explanatory variables. 
Beauty’s coefficient is not significantly different from zero, as almost all other explanatory 
variables. 
In the same table, we also look at the impact of beauty on the difference between the 
number of oral and written exams passed by the students. To be consistent with a 
discrimination type of explanation for the effects of beauty on performances, we would 
expect γ > 0, i.e., more handsome people doing more oral exams. Instead, we find that 
when there is an effect of  beauty, in the regression for males, this is in fact negative, 
meaning that better looking students have passed more written exams. Again, if any, we 
believe that this evidence would be consistent with a productivity effect of beauty. 
To summarize, we believe that we have evidence that allows us to reject the pure 
discrimination effect of beauty on performance. Instead, given that in our dataset beauty 
does in fact affect students’ performances at university, we argue that we can opt for a 
productivity type of explanation: more handsome students are also more productive. We 
explore possible explanations for this result in the following section. 
 
                                                           
8 Incidentally, this result seems to provide support to the theory that society has higher expectations on the 
performance of beautiful people compared to the rest. Given these expectations, an average performance by   14
 
IV. Discussion: Why is better looking also smarter? 
 
This research has found a relationship between attractiveness and an index of 
performance. The motivation of our study was the economic literature on beauty and the 
labour market and its startling result that looks have a clear impact on earnings. An 
important unanswered question in the literature is asked directly by Daniel S. Hamermesh 
when he describes his research on the Economics of Beauty: “Do good looks make people 
more productive – can we ever distinguish between the effects of beauty, or some other 
characteristic, as discrimination or productivity?”.
9 
By distinguishing between oral exams (where beauty is observed) and written exams 
(where it is not), this paper has not found any direct evidence for discrimination, a result 
similar to experimental economics evidence that ruled out any Becker-type discrimination 
effect (Mobius and Rosenblat, 2004). Thus our evidence suggests that good looks could 
make people more productive. In this Section we will discuss some of the existing literature 
on the effects of facial attractiveness in order to find a possible explanation for the positive 
relationship between beauty and productivity, starting with the non-economic literature. 
A very comprehensive review of the literature is that by Langlois et al. (2000) which 
conducts a quantitative review of the effects of facial attractiveness using hundreds of 
papers from published and unpublished sources from 1932 to 1999. This article concludes 
that: 1) Beauty is not in the eye of the beholder, i.e., contrary to conventional wisdom there 
is a common standard of beauty both within and across cultures. 2) People do judge a book 
by its cover, i.e., attractive adults and children are judged more favourably and treated more 
positively than unattractive adults and children, even by those who know them. 3) Beauty is 
not only skin deep, i.e., although both attractive and less attractive individuals exhibit 
positive behaviours and traits, attractive individuals tend to exhibit more positive 
behaviours and traits than unattractive individuals.  
Another important contribution of the aforementioned paper is to discuss the various 
theoretical mechanisms explaining why beauty influences judgment, treatment and 
behaviour. In this respect, the literature distinguishes between social expectancy theories 
and fitness-related evolutionary theories. The first set of theories is based on the 
assumptions that cultural norms and experience influence the behaviour of both targets and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
them is penalized. For a discussion of these effects in a public good experiment see Andreoni and Petrie 
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perceivers and that social stereotypes create their own reality (like a self-fulfilling 
prophecy). The second set of theories posits that morphological characteristics are 
indicators of fitness, health, quality and reproductive value. According to this second group 
of theories, beauty is an important aspect in human relations which operates through 
channels like mate selection and differential parental solicitude. While the first channel 
makes no predictions regarding the importance of attractiveness for children, since they are 
clearly not involved in selecting a mate, the second channel could be designed to explain 
children’s behaviour. In fact, it posits that if attractiveness is perceived as an indicator of 
quality, adults should invest more in attractive than unattractive children to enhance their 
own reproductive success.  
Based on their review of the literature, Langlois et al. (2000) concludes that although 
predictions from both social expectancy and fitness-related evolutionary theories are 
partially supported, neither theory is totally successful in predicting the various findings, 
and much additional research is needed before we can find how and why facial 
attractiveness influences social behaviour and development. 
Recent economic literature recognizes the growing consensus that physical attributes, 
e.g., beauty and height, can affect the acquisition of non-cognitive skills. These latter 
represent a form of human capital and contribute substantially to labor market success. 
Heckman (2000), for instance, reports evidence that preschool programs improve students’ 
social skills and motivation and hence can raise lifetime earnings. Persico et al. (2004) 
found that about half of the “height premium” in the labor market can be accounted for by 
variation in participation in school sponsored non academic activities. Being tall as an 
adolescent, they conclude, facilitates the acquisition of some form of human capital, like 
social adaptability, confidence and the ability to interact socially with others.  
In a recent paper, Mobius and Rosenblat (2004) report the results of an experimental 
labor market study decomposing the beauty premium and identifying three channels 
through which physical attractiveness can raise an employer’s estimate of a worker’s 
ability. Since the confidence channel influences workers’ beliefs, they show that better 
looking workers are substantially more self-confident. Their paper is thus consistent with 
the psychological and economic research and the anecdotal evidence emphasizing that “... 
people do recognize the income-enhancing effects of confidence ...” and thus “... the need 
for positive-thinking and for self-esteem as one key to success ...” (Mobius and Rosenblat, 
2004: 6). 
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In a theoretical paper, Benabou and Tirole (2002) analyze the value placed by Bayesian 
rational agents on self-confidence and its effects in enhancing motivation. Indeed, self-
confidence is valuable to the extent that it improves the individual’s motivation to 
undertake projects and persevere in the pursuit of her goals. Ability and effort may interact 
in determining performance: in most instances they are complements, and so a higher self-
confidence improves the motivation to act. In addition, people have imperfect knowledge of 
their own skills and abilities, and standard observation shows that morale plays an 
important role in difficult endeavors. This recent theoretical literature thus accomplish to 
model the influence of behavioral traits, to be distinguished from cognitive ability, i.e., 
more productive skills that can be acquired through education or proper training, on 
earnings differentials. Indeed, as Bowles et al. (2001) emphasize, seemingly irrelevant 
characteristics such as height, beauty, obesity have a potential role as reliable predictors of 
earnings. 
To conclude and summarize, we view these theories as important in explaining our 
results. If beauty has an effect on performance, and one can rule out pure Becker-type 
discrimination as we do, the hypothesis that good looks make people more productive finds 
some support in these theoretical mechanisms. Essentially the higher productivity of 
attractive people could be the result of pure discrimination in the past because of different 
parental (and teacher) solicitude or of past and current social stereotypes that affect self-
esteem and motivation and hence productivity via a self-fulfilling prophecy.
10  
We view the fact that we can rule out another important possibility, i.e., that differential 
attractiveness can simply influence professor appraisals of students’ performance though 
pure discrimination, as an important result of our paper. Given this perspective, one can 
relate our results to complement the received literature on the effects of beauty in the labour 
market. If differential productivity at the university translates in differential productivity at 
work, differences in wages arising from differences in attractiveness could also be the 
result of different performances. In other words, the proportion of wage differential that can 
be attributed to greater productivity as opposed to discrimination may be higher than what 




                                                           
10 As noted by Langlois et al. the question of why and how stereotypes based on attractiveness originated in 
the first place remains unanswered.   17
 
We conduct an empirical analysis using a large dataset of students’ records and find 
evidence of a positive impact of facial attractiveness on their performance at the university. 
This is in line with the results of a number of papers in the labor literature which find that 
workers’ looks have a positive impact on their earnings. The main results of our empirical 
analysis are three: 1) The impact of beauty is positive and significant in the decision to 
participate, that is to sit and pass exams once enrolled at the university. 2) Beauty affects 
significantly and positively the performance of active students, i.e., students who chooses 
to sit exams. 3) Distinguishing between oral exams (where beauty can be observed by the 
professors) and written exams (where it cannot be observed) allows us to reject the 
hypothesis of pure Becker-type discrimination based on beauty and stemming from 
professorial tastes. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the theories advanced by 
the psychological and economic literature to explain why attractiveness may influence 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Min. Max. 
High School grade  846  0.780  0.121  0.6  1 
Number of exams (>0)  644  17.669 10.759  1  37 
Performance (log)  644  5.674  1.134  2.890  6.937 
D number o/w  644  -0.360  2.907  -11  9 
D mark o/w  507 1.672 2.122  -10  12 
Beauty (standardized)  885  0  3.842  -9.523 11.145
Male 430       
Liceo 268       
Technical 508       
Professional 102       
Other   7       
Eci 235       
Resident 667       
Year_82 518       
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Table 2. The impact of beauty on performance (Tobit estimates) 
Variable All  Male  Female  All  Male  Female 
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Beautiful (top 
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Pseudo R
2  0.082  0.096 0.073  0.082 0.095  0.075 
Number  obs  846  415 431  846 415  431 
Robust standard errors in parentheses below the parameter estimates. 
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Table 3. The impact of beauty on the number of exams and on the average grade 
(Tobit estimates) 
Variable   No.  Exams     Average 
mark 
 




























































































           
Pseudo R
2  0.049  0.059 0.042  0.059 0.07 0.049 
Number  obs  846  415 431  846 415  431 
Robust standard errors in parentheses below the parameter estimates. 
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Table 4. The impact of beauty on the number of oral and written exams (Tobit 
estimates) 
Variable   Oral 
Exams 
   Written 
Exams 
 




























































































           
Pseudo R
2  0.06 0.072 0.049  0.065 0.075  0.058 
Number  obs  846  415 431  846 415  431 
Robust standard errors in parentheses below the parameter estimates. 
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Table 5. The impact of beauty on the average grade of oral and written exams (Tobit 
estimates) 
Variable   Oral 
Exams 
   Written 
Exams 
 




























































































           
Pseudo R
2  0.058  0.066 0.049  0.069 0.072  0.069 
Number  obs  846  415 431  846 415  431 
Robust standard errors in parentheses below the parameter estimates.   24
Table 6. The impact of beauty on individual differences in performances (OLS 
estimates) 
Variable   D grade 
o/w 
   D number 
o/w 
 




























































































          
R
2  0.049  0.111 0.028  0.039 0.053 0.043 
Number  obs  494  224 224  621 295 326 
Robust standard errors in parentheses below the parameter estimates. 